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Equalization Transfers in Canada: Emerging Challenges 
Prakash Chandra Jha  
Abstract: Since the last one decade or so equalization transfer programme has been a principal source of dispute 
between federal and provincial governments and among provinces. It has become politically controversial given the 
lack of predictability, accountability and adhoc change in the formula and use of transfer for electoral purpose, 
among others. Resource federalism has become another major challenge as provinces are now strongly divided 
between those that possess natural resources and those that do not. Unlike earlier, the major proportion of Canadian 
population today resides in equalization receiving have-not provinces. This has had profound consequence on fiscal 
federalism. The very nature of equalization programme and institution of executive federalism through which 
transfer is operated are highly politicized.  The idea of having a non-partisan and independent body responsible for 
determining and allocating equalization transfers is resisted by both orders of government. The paper examines these 
challenges.  
 
1. Introduction:  
 
Canada has one of the most developed federal-provincial transfer systems in the world. 
Equalization transfer programme is its major element. According to Joe Clark (Former Prime 
Minister of Canada) equalization along with pensions and medicare as programmes, “confirmed 
that we are a society as well as geography” (as cited by Cowan, 2014). Formula through which 
equalization transfer is made is quite complex. Commenting on its complexity expert panel on 
Equalization and Territorial Formula Financing stated: “….Equalization has been largely ignored 
by the vast majority of Canadians and it is understood by only a select few academics, experts, 
and finance officials across the country” (Expert Panel on Equalization and Territorial Formula 
Financing, 2006). Since the last one decade or so equalization transfer programme remains a 
principal source of dispute between federal and provincial governments and among provinces. 
Although equalization transfer became key political issue, yet few scholars have paid systematic 
attention to the political dimensions of Canada’s federal equalization programme (Lecours and 
Be’land, 2012, 569). This is so because most of the scholars examined equalization transfers 
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from the perspectives of the first generation theory (FGT) of fiscal federalism. Being mostly 
public finance economists they also confine themselves to economic aspects and analyses most 
of the problems of fiscal federalism in near isolation from political dynamics of federalism. They 
assume governments (both federal and provincial) as benevolent and maximiser of public 
welfare functions. The second generation scholars of fiscal federalism, on the other hand, 
contend that if given opportunity, government may involve in ‘rent-seeking activities’. The 
second generation theory (SGT) has emphasised on the incentives created by political process 
and institution. Second generation theorists have studied two different effects of inter-
governmental transfers: incentive of federal government to make transfers of funds; and the 
incentives these funds create for sub-national governments (Weingast, 1995, Rodden 2002, 
Wibbels, 2001; 2002).  Simply put, government being political actor acts according to incentive 
or disincentive created by political process and institution. For example a minority government at 
federal level would tend to make more transfers to provinces that help it to survive. Similarly, 
provincial governments being political actors would like to extract as much transfers as possible 
from the federal government. Second generation scholars of fiscal federalism therefore focus on 
designing institution for making transfers in such a manner that incentivises both order of 
government (Jha, 2007).   
The equalisation transfer programme has historically played a major role in the development of 
low income provinces in Canada. Out of the four major inter-governmental transfers, 
equalisation transfer is constitutional while rest of them are non-constitutional transfers.1 
Equalization transfer is unconditional transfer as it is made unconditionally to the low-income 
provinces based on their tax capacities and are aimed at making all provinces capable of 
financing some minimum national standard of public services (See Chart 1). Equalisation 
transfer is determined by federal government on the basis of a formula decided by the federal 
government with extensive consultation with provinces. Arguably rich provinces, also known as 
‘the haves’, contribute to equalization transfer whereas poor provinces (‘the have-not’) receive 
the transfer. There has been a great deal of consensus among provinces and citizen over 
equalization (Mendelsohn, 2002, 41). It is also evident from its continuance over five decades. 
                                                          
1 They include Canadian Social Transfers (CST), Canadian Health Transfers (HST), Territorial Formula Financing 
(TFF) and Equalisation Transfers 
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However, of late, the divide between the resource-rich ‘haves’ and the resource-poor ‘haves-not’ 
provinces has become intense. Most of the studies/researches on equalisation transfers have been 
done by economists from the perspectives of first generation theory of fiscal federalism (FGT) 
which advocates determination and allocation of equalization and other intergovernmental 
transfers across jurisdictions on the basis of formula. But even formula-based programme as 
Canadian equalization illustrates, is susceptible to political influences, through adhoc changes in 
the formula. It is important for scholars of fiscal federalism to understand how political forces 
influence the design and evolution of transfer programme. First generation theorists however fail 
to capture the political motivation behind transfers, incentive etc. The paper argues that second 
generation theory (SGT) of Fiscal federalism-- that had contributions also from political 
scientists-- is much more useful to the understanding of challenges emanating from equalization 
transfer system in Canada (Weingast, 1995, Rodden 2002, Wibbels, 2001; 2002)2. One leading 
scholar on federalism has observed: “Intergovernmental financial arrangements are therefore not 
simply technical adjustments but inevitably the result of political compromise. Thus, 
understanding of intergovernmental financial relations requires an understanding of the political 
context within which they occur” (Watts, 2003, 2). Second generation scholars apart from 
dealing with political dimension and political motivation of transfer have also focused upon re-
designing the intergovernmental transfers in ways that can safeguard them against political 
interference. Protection against the influence of politics is considered vital in maximizing the 
efficiency and retaining credibility of the transfers. The motivation for the study is scarcity of 
work in Canada on equalization programme from the perspectives of the second generation 
theory of fiscal federalism (Jha, 2007; Lecours and Beland, 2010, 569; Jaonai, 2014b).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Political Scientists like Weingast, Rodden, Wibbels etc. have contributed to the second generation scholarship of 
fiscal federalism. 
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Chart 1: Federal Transfers to Provinces and Territories, 2014-15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Finance Canada (2014), Government of Canada, URL: 
http://www.fin.gc.ca/fedprov/mtp-eng.asp 
 
 
2. Overview of Equalisation Transfers 
 
There is a great deal of literature on economic basis of equalization. Economic justification of 
the programme is based on the problem of inter-jurisdictional spillover. Economists working in 
the area of fiscal federalism argue that without equalization, economically stronger 
provinces/states would be able to offer significantly lower taxes, thus would  entice skilled 
workers and businesses from economically disadvantaged provinces with higher taxes. Weaker 
provinces would feel the need to compete by lowering taxes. Further weaker province would be 
inclined to under-invest in the development of skilled workers because such workers might be 
lured away by the higher wages and/or lower taxes of a economically stronger province. 
Consequently, the quality of life in the financially weak provinces would decline (Oates, 1999; 
Ahmad, 1997). Other rationales for equalization are constitutional, political, social and moral. 
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There are certain public goods and services to which all Canadians, no matter where they may 
live, are equally entitled as a right of citizenship. Equalization transfers are necessary to enable 
all provinces, especially the less affluent, to offer such services (Milne, 1998, 185). Canada is 
distinct from other federal countries given the fact that equalization transfers are included in the 
Constitution. Thus the federal government is under constitutional obligation to make equalization 
transfers to provinces. Another very important basis for the equalization transfers is the nation-
building or holding federation together (Black and Silver, 2004, 5-7). According to David Milne 
“equalization should also be justified on moral grounds, as a question of decency and social 
justice” (Milne, 1998, 186). A survey research found very strong support for the equalization 
programme nationwide, even in the ‘have provinces’ that do not receive transfers (Mendelsohn, 
2002, 41). Above mentioned rationales and objectives of transfers may be held hostage by 
political forces. Before discussing these and related issues, let us make an overview of 
equalization transfers in Canada.  
The equalization programme has undergone several changes since its inception in 1957. While 
there is equalization of provincial fiscal capacity, expenditure needs of provinces are not 
equalised. Given its importance, equalization transfer  programme has also been incorporated in 
the constitutional Act of 1982 which proclaims: (i) that the national  government  and  
Parliament and the provincial governments and legislatures “are committed to promoting equal 
opportunities for the well-being of Canadians, furthering economic development to reduce 
disparities in opportunities, and providing essential public services of reasonable quality  to  all  
Canadians”; and  (ii)  that  the  government and Parliament of Canada “are committed to the  
principle  of  making equalization  payments  to ensure that  provincial  governments have 
sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably 
comparable levels of taxation”  (Subsection 36 (2) of the Constitution Act of 1982 as cited in 
Boadway, 2005, 1). 
 
Right from its institutionalization in 1957, the programme has been subject to debates as to how 
equalization transfer should be calculated. Two issues that have been central to this debate 
include calculation of the national standard and calculation of individual provincial 
fiscal capacities. The number of provinces forming the national standard has undergone several 
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changes. A province’s fiscal capacity was measured against the average taxing capacity of 
Ontario and British Columbia (Canada’s two richest provinces at the time) in 1957. In the 1960s, 
the federal government changed the calculation to include all 10 provinces. Since 1967 Canada 
has adopted representative tax system (RTS) approach in determining amount of equalization 
transfers. Under RTS, the amount of equalization that a province receives is determined by 
reference to (i) that province’s own-source per capita revenue capacity and (ii) a standard level 
of per capita revenue capacity. In 1982, the federal government removed both Alberta and the 
poorer provinces from the calculation. The national standard was thus based on the average 
taxing capacity of five middle-income provinces – British Columbia, Ontario, Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba and Quebec. In 2007, the Conservative government under Prime Minister Harper 
introduced significant reforms to the equalization programme. Under new system, national 
standard was based on the average fiscal capacities of all 10 provinces. In order to deal with 
problems emanating from resource rich provinces, the new system includes only 50 per cent of 
provincial resource revenues in calculations of the national standard. The new equalization 
arrangement significantly reduced the number of items used to determine a province’s fiscal 
capacity. Instead of taking into account 33 different types of provincial revenues, the 
equalization system was based on only five types of provincial revenues: personal income tax, 
business income tax, consumption tax, property tax and natural resources. The federal 
government reintroduced a formula-based approach to equalization, replacing the fixed-sum 
programme that had been in place since 2004. Further, the fiscal capacity cap was introduced in 
2007 in order to limit eligible provinces’ per capita transfers. The cap was introduced because of 
the impact that partial exclusion of natural resource revenues can have on provincial fiscal 
capacities (Chassin 2012).  
 
Further in 2009, the federal government changed the equalization formula by adding a ‘ceiling’ 
in order to limit the total amount of equalization transfers. At that time, Ontario – Canada’s most 
populous province – was about to become an equalization-receiving province. With the adoption 
of ceiling, the total amount of equalization transfers is no longer formula-driven and does not 
vary in accordance with changes in fiscal disparities among the provinces. Since 2009, the total 
amount of equalization transfers has grown annually in accordance with a three year moving 
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average rate of growth in Canada’s nominal gross domestic product (GDP). A province’s 
equalization in any given year is based on a weighted three year moving average, lagged by two 
years. For example, the actual payment for a province in 2013–2014 is the sum of 50 per cent of 
its payment for 2011–2012, 25 per cent of its payment for 2010–2011 and 25 per cent of its 
payment for 2009–2010. This weighted moving average was introduced in 2007 to stabilize year-
to-year fluctuations in provincial equalization transfers, and thus to address the volatility and 
uncertainty that was a feature of the pre-2004 formula. Under the pre-2004 formula, the frequent 
revision of equalization transfers made it difficult for provincial governments to plan their 
budget (Parliament of Canada, 2013).  
 
Table 1 shows equalization transfers from the federal government to provinces from 2000-2001 
to 2014-2015. Alberta is the only province that has not got any amount during this period, while 
Prince Edward Island (PEI), Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba and Québec have received 
the transfers every year. On average Québec has received about 55 per cent of the federal 
equalization transfers. The Saskatchewan and British Columbia have received the transfers from 
2001-02 to 2006-07. From 2010-11 to 2013-14, the amounts received by Québec have declined, 
while Ontario’s have increased. Recent data of 2014-15, however, shows decline in amount 
received by Ontario and significant rise of equalization payment of Quebec. This happened 
because of change in the equalization formula. In 2014-15, C$16.7 billion in equalization 
transfers were made to six provinces -- Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, 
Quebec, Ontario and Manitoba. 
Table 1: Equalization Transfers from 2000-01 to 2014-15 
(C$ Million) 
YEAR NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC TOTAL 
2000-01 1,112 269 1,404 1,260 5,380 0 1,314 208 0 0 10,948 
2001-02 1,055 256 1,315 1,202 4,679 0 1,362 200 0 240 10,310 
2002-03 875 235 1,122 1,143 4,004 0 1,303 106 0 71 8,859 
2003-04 766 232 1,130 1,142 3,764 0 1,336 0 0 320 8,690 
2004-05 762 277 1,313 1,326 4,155 0 1,607 652 0 682 10,774 
2005-06 861 277 1,344 1,348 4,798 0 1,601 89 0 590 10,907 
2006-07 687 291 1,386 1,451 5,539 0 1,709 13 0 459 11,535 
2007-08 477 294 1,465 1,477 7,160 0 1,826 226 0 0 12,925 
2008-09 0 322 1,465 1,584 8,028 0 2,063 0 0 0 13,462 
2009-10 0 340 1,391 1,689 8,355 347 2,063 0 0 0 14,185 
2010-11 0 330 1,110 1,581 8,552 972 1,826 0 0 0 14,372 
2011-12 0 329 1,167 1,483 7,815 2,200 1,666 0 0 0 14,659 
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2012-13 0 337 1,268 1,495 7,391 3,261 1,671 0 0 0 15,423 
2013-14 0 340 1,458 1,513 7,833 3,169 1,792 0 0 0 16,105 
2014-15 0 360 1,619 1,666 9,286 1,988 1,750 0 0 0 16,669 
 
Source: Finance Canada, Government of Canada, URL: http://www.fin.gc.ca/fedprov/mtp-
eng.asp 
Table 2 shows that with the change in formula in 2014, Quebec’s share of equalization has 
increased significantly. Ontario’s equalization share considerably declined in 2014-15 due to 
change in formula.  
Table 2: Changes in Equalization Transfers since 2013-14 Onwards (C$ Millions) 
 
Provinces 2013-14 2014-15 % Change 
NL 0.0 0.0 0 
PEI 339.5 359.8 
 
6.0%  
NS 1457.9 1619.5 11.1%  
NB 1513.1  1666.0 10.1% 
QC 7833.0 9285.7 18.5% 
ON 3169.4 1988.4  -37.3%  
MB 1792.3 1749.9 -2.4%  
SK 0.0 0.0 - 
AL 0.0 0.0 - 
BC 0.0 0.0 - 
Source: Parliament Budget Officer (2014, 4), “2014-15 Federal Transfers to Provinces and 
Territories”, Ottawa: Government of Canada, 19 June, URL: http://www.pbo-
dpb.gc.ca/files/files/TransferPayments_EN.pdf  
 
Table 3 shows the amounts received by provinces on per capita basis. While Québec received the 
largest amount, this is not so on a per capita basis; Ontario has received very less in 2014-15 
compared to previous year. In per capita terms, the three Maritime Provinces are the principal 
beneficiaries because they are the least wealthy. 
Table 3:  Changes in Equalization on per capita basis from 2013-14 onwards 
 (C$ Millions) 
 
Provinces 2013-14 2014-15 % Change 
NL 0.0 0.0 - 
PEI 2339.3  2477.6  5.9%  
NS 1549.2  1728.1  11.5%  
NB 2001.4 2205.8  10.2%  
QC 961.5  1129.7 17.5%  
ON 234.4 145.7  -37.8%  
MB 1418.2 1367.4  -3.6%  
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SK 0.0  0.0  - 
AL 0.0  0.0  - 
BC 0.0  0.0 - 
Source: Parliament Budget Officer (2014, 4), “2014-15 Federal Transfers to Provinces and 
Territories”, Ottawa: Government of Canada, 19 June, URL: http://www.pbo-
dpb.gc.ca/files/files/TransferPayments_EN.pdf 
 
Equalization transfers have played significant role in the reduction of regional economic 
disparities in Canada. Canada is also known for having “maintained one of the simplest, most 
elegant, principled, and purpose-driven intergovernmental finance systems in the world” (as 
cited in Leuprecht, 2007, 259). Equalisation programme has also been subject to numerous 
criticisms. Some of the criticisms have been longstanding ones; some are politically 
controversial and recent ones. A major longstanding shortcoming of the transfers is that only 
differences in tax capacity of provinces are equalised. It does not give any consideration to 
differences in expenditures of provinces that arise due to differences in needs or costs. For 
example, differences in need may arise due to demographic features of a province (Brown, 
1996). Similarly, costs of providing services may differ from one province to other due to 
geographic features. Equalisation transfers, not based on expenditure needs of provinces, are not 
constitutional. Clark (1998, 104) points out that constitutional commitment to equalisation 
suggests not only equalisation of ‘fiscal capacities’ of provinces but also ’expenditure needs’ in 
determining their equalisation entitlements. The cost of service delivery in poorer regions is 
usually cheaper than in more affluent ones, since wages and the cost of social and educational 
services tend to be lower, as the incentive for immigrants to settle in such areas is lower (Gusen, 
2012). 
 
Equalisation programme has also been attacked for creating perverse incentive, i.e., ‘tax back 
effect’. It has been observed that an increase in economic activity in a province results in a more 
or less significant reduction in equalization transfers to the province. Interestingly, this is 
consistent with the programme’s objective: a decrease in a province’s relative poverty should 
result in a decrease in transfers under the programme designed to offset poverty. This is called 
the ‘tax back effect’. The so-called ‘tax back effect’ can potentially make it less interesting for 
provinces receiving equalization to implement measures to stimulate their economic 
development. For example, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia have, in the past, clearly expressed 
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their concerns that development of their offshore oil and natural gas resources would generate 
little net benefit for their provinces because of so called ‘tax back effect’ of the equalization 
(Boadway, 2005). Similarly, Saskatchewan, a have-not province, had argued that the 
equalization programme overstates the province’s wealth, or fiscal capacity, from the production 
of non-renewable resources. Courchene (2004, 2) argues that “Canada’s equalization programme 
has more than fully confiscated Saskatchewan’s energy revenues”. 
 
Mackinnon (2011) has come up with some astonishing evidence of the negative implication of 
equalization transfer programme. According to him on average Alberta, Ontario and British 
Columbia have 24 per cent fewer registered nurses for every 100000 people than the equalizing 
receiving provinces of New Brunswick, PEA, Nova Scotia and Manitoba. Known as economic 
engines that drive the Canadian economy, Alberta, Ontario and British Columbia have lowest 
number of nursing home beds per capita. Mackinnon further states that Quebec the largest 
recipient of equalization transfers (over 50 per cent of the total equalization transfers) subsidises 
day care at the rate of C$7 per day and has the lowest university tuition fees among all provinces. 
On the other hand Ontario has the least accessible public sector of all Canadian provinces. He 
further argues that equalization transfer programme has created the culture of dependency for the 
have-not provinces.  
 
Another major longstanding problem associated with equalisation transfers, is that transfers 
provide lack of predictability to the provinces. Though provinces are consulted on regular basis, 
however, it is Ottawa which has the final word. It has been observed that several times in 
Canadian history federal government had unilaterally reduced the transfers inviting provincial 
rebuke and in the process causing over politicization of equalization programme--an issues 
discussed at length in other section. Since 2004, equalisation transfers are also plagued with 
adhoc approach, introduction to new framework, ceiling, fiscal capacity cap, change in 
weightage given to revenue from provincial natural resources and side deal with some provinces 
departing thereby from principled approach. In fact, of all the issues involved in equalization 
programme, the treatment of resource revenues in the equalization formula is the most 
controversial.  
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 3. Resources Federalism and Equalization Transfers 
Provinces in Canada own, manage and tax their natural resources, and raise most of their own 
revenues. This leads to large differences in provincial fiscal capacities. As has been discussed 
earlier, the federal government is constitutionally bound to address fiscal disparities among the 
provinces. The federal equalization programme is the main instrument to deal with these 
disparities. The natural resources of provinces have arguably been the major source of difficulty 
in the proper implementation of Canadian equalization programme. At present, natural resources 
have come to occupy an important place in Canadian economy. The difference in the availability 
of natural resources among the provinces and the instable nature of their prices remain the major 
concern. The big challenge before Canadian transfer system, therefore, is how to transform these 
unstable revenues into more stable revenues for the purpose of equalization.  
 
There are two schools, i.e., province-centric and citizen-centric in Canada. The former subscribes 
to the view that since natural resources belong to the provinces and therefore they should alone 
benefit from these resources on the behalf of their citizens. The latter posits that revenues from 
the natural resources are like any other revenues that serve to finance services to the citizens; 
therefore there is no reason to treat them differently. The degree of inclusion of natural resources 
in equalization formula has varied with the weight given to these two opposing schools of 
thought. It is truism to say that the degree of inclusion of revenue from natural resources 
influence the provinces in developing their resources. Differences in the availability of natural 
resources among the provinces propel the need for redistribution on the part of federal 
government. Because resource revenues are concentrated in three provinces namely 
Newfoundland and Labrador, Saskatchewan and Alberta, the inclusion rate for resource revenues 
in the equalization formula has a major impact on total equalization entitlements. For example in 
2011-12, total equalization entitlements would have been C$24.2 billion with a 100 per cent 
inclusion rate, instead of C$17.8 billion with the 50 per cent inclusion rate that was used.  Thus 
inclusion rate of natural resources in equalization formula is perennial issue (Dahlby, 2014). “In 
the past, there has been an effort to include 100 per cent of resource revenues in the equalization 
calculation formula, as opposed to 50 per cent at present. It would be little surprising to see such 
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attempts occur again in the future, especially as Ontario is now in the ‘have-not’ category” 
(Mike, 2014, 7). 
Another major issue is increasing the size of equalization receiving provinces. Since 2008-09 the 
share in population of the ‘have-not’ provinces requiring transfers is relatively large compared to 
the share in population of the ‘have’ provinces. Hence, it can be argued that in such scenario the 
task of redistribution is difficult.  Before 2008-09 the population of the have provinces are quite 
large, compared to have-not provinces, the task of redistribution can be more easily handled (See 
Table 4). 
Table 4: Have and Have-not Provinces 
 
Before 2008-2009 
Have Provinces British Columbia, Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, Ontario, and 
Newfoundland & Labrador 
68% of the population 
Have-not Provinces or 
equalizing receiving 
Prince Edward Island, Nova 
Scotia, New Brunswick, 
Quebec, and Manitoba 
32% of the population 
After 2009-2000  
Have Provinces British Columbia, Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, and 
Newfoundland & Labrador 
 30 % of population 
Have-not Provinces or 
equalizing receiving 
Ontario, Prince Edward 
Island, Nova Scotia, New 
Brunswick, Quebec, and 
Manitoba 
70 % of population 
 
Source: Adapted from Milke, Mark, (2014, 4), “Equalization, Ontario, and the Politics of 
Division”, Fraser Institute Bulletin, URL: http://www.fraserinstitute.org/uploadedFiles/fraser-
ca/Content/research-news/research/publications/equalization-ontario-and-the-politics-of-
division.pdf 
 
Being over-politicized, federal equalization transfer programme in recent time has come to be 
understood as a programme that transfers income from taxpayers in ‘the have’ provinces to the 
‘the have-not’ provinces. The resource-rich provinces would always prefer non-inclusion of 
revenue from their natural resources or less weightage given to it in the equalization formula. 
‘The have-not’ provinces favour inclusion of natural resources because this would give them 
more equalization transfers. The treatment of provincial governments’ resource revenues thus is 
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a never-ending issue in the design of the equalization programme. Before 2009 when Ontario 
was not an equalization receiving province, it was a stabilizing factor for the Canadian 
equalization programme due to the size of its economy and the lesser role that natural resources 
play in this province’s economy. With the increase in the size of equalization receiving provinces 
with inclusion of Ontario --having 40 per cent of the total population of Canada and 40 per cent 
of GDP -- political importance as well as visibility of programme have increased.  
 
According to Bernard (2012) the revenue of western provinces is more variable given their 
dependency in natural resources. This in turn leads to a greater variability in equalization 
transfers. Further, Ottawa’s revenues are also subject to the variability of resource prices. “This 
new era of increased dependence on natural resources will be a source of tension between the 
federal government and the receiving provinces; also between the ‘have’ provinces and the 
‘have-not’ provinces. As owners of the natural resources, the provinces that draw revenues from 
them are not inclined to share their rents with the other members of the federation which are less 
well off” (Bernard 2012, 16).There is thus growing realisation among provinces with non-
renewal resources that including their resources into the calculation of provincial fiscal capacity 
was highly unfair. Aside from controversies surrounding resource federalism, equalization 
transfers are highly politicized thanks to Canada’s executive federalism.  
 
4. Executive Federalism and Equalization Transfers 
 
While there is strong executive federalism, legislative federalism in Canada is very weak. The 
combination of strong executive federalism and weak legislative federalism gives political and 
electoral incentives to federal and provincial executive to negotiate any change in equalization 
transfer programme. Therefore, the programme becomes highly politicized. Further, first-past- 
the- post electoral system and confederal nature of political parties strengthen executives at both 
levels.3 Therefore, equalization transfers are highly politicized and are seen as a tool to reward 
some provinces or punish others. 
                                                          
3 In Canada, senators are not elected; they are appointed by the federal executive for life time. This, in the opinion of 
Cameron and Simeon, has two consequences for Canadian federalism. First, these unelected senators are not in a 
position to compete with the provincial premiers as spokespersons for their provinces. Second, since senators are 
appointed by the federal executive branch, rather than executive branches or legislatures of the constituent entities. 
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Furthermore, very low level of citizen’s participation in public affairs is attributed to executive 
federalism. This adds to undue secrecy in the conduct of the public business and weakens the 
accountability of governments to their legislatures and to the people. This is further compounded 
by the low level of public understanding of equalization programme due to its complex formula. 
Thus central characteristic of intergovernmental relations in Canada is its executive dominated 
character (Cameron and Simeon, 2002, 292). A leading authority on Canadian federalism 
argued:  
The regionalisation of the party system is reinforced by the effects of the electoral system, which exaggerates the 
seats won by narrow regionally-based parties, and weakens parties whose support is spread more nationally. The 
result is that major parts of the country feel frozen out of power at the federal level: they are not represented in the 
governing party, where authority is concentrated; and the opposition parties they do support are virtually powerless 
in the parliamentary system. It is not surprising, then, that citizens turn to their provincial governments as the ones 
that better represent them, and support their efforts to defend provincial interests in the arena of executive federalism 
(Simeon, 2001). 
Thus the executive dominated character of intergovernmental relations in Canada explains the 
highly politicized nature of equalization transfers (Cameron and Simeon, 2002, 292). Following 
second generation scholarship on fiscal federalism, one can argue that over politicization of 
equalization transfers helps both orders of government. Provinces and federal government act 
rationally as they have their own political objectives. They seek to maximize their own political 
gain first instead of thinking the welfare of society as a whole. Politicization of programme can 
be understood in the context of institutional structure within which the programme operates as 
well as the dynamics of Canadian federalism. As has been discussed, Canada’s federal 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Inter-governmental relations in Canada consequently take place between executives that are clearly distinct and that 
are not institutionally linked to Parliament.  In Canada, political parties are ‘confederal’ in nature. Federal and 
provincial parties, even of the same name, are distinct from each other. The pressures for party discipline within 
each government have created separate federal and provincial branch of parties into more autonomous layers of 
party organization (Cameron and Simeon, 2002, 292). 
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institutional arrangements support politicization of equalization policy because provincial leaders 
can exert pressure on the federal government to amend the programme to their advantage. 
Provinces are quite aware of their potential to exert influence on the design of equalization. This 
awareness is reflected by the provincial opposition to have an independent non-partisan 
institution. According to Lecours and Beland (2010), reform in equalization formula is seen in 
terms of federal government choosing provincial ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. Provinces whose leaders 
think that their provinces are losers vehemently attack federal government. As far as the federal 
government is concerned, its promises, or decisions on equalization transfers, are often guided 
less by economics and more by political considerations. It is evident from the fact that reform in 
equalization formula in 2007, leading to significant rise in transfers of Quebec, was announced a 
week before election there. This was clearly seen as a move by the minority Conservative 
government, not only to help a federalist ally in Quebec, but also to get the Quebec ‘soft’ 
nationalist vote that could help the Conservatives form a majority government at the next 
election (Stevenson 2007; Lecours and Beland, 2010). 
 
In October 2004, the Martin government introduced the ‘New Framework to Equalization’ 
reform that set the fixed-pool sum for equalization at a minimum of C$10 billion. It became a 
source of political problems for the Martin government as the resource-rich provinces did not 
like the inclusion of non-renewable resources into the calculation of provincial fiscal capacity for 
equalization. Martin had to sign Offshore Accords with Newfoundland and Nova Scotia 
providing full compensation to them for any reduction in equalization transfers resulting from 
increased revenue linked to offshore resources.4 As a result Newfoundland, an equalization 
receiving province, had a higher fiscal capacity after equalization transfer than Ontario, a non-
recipient province at that time.   
                                                          
4 During the 2004 First Ministers Conference, then Prime Minister Paul Martin met with the provincial Premiers as 
part of his election promise to negotiate changes to the equalization programme, Newfoundland & Labrador 
Premier, attacked the PM for not keeping his election promise to allow Newfoundland & Labrador to retain 100 per 
cent of their oil and gas revenues – without decreasing their equalization payments in any way. Premier of 
Newfoundland & Labrador even had gone to the extent of ordering the removal of Canadian flags from buildings of 
province in protest. In early 2005, federal government made peace by making a lucrative side deal that entitled the 
province to keep 100 per cent of their resource revenue for eight years. Another Atlantic province, Nova Scotia, 
managed to have a similar eight year agreement with Ottawa. What followed was demand by Canada’s Northwest 
Territories for the similar preferential treatment, followed shortly by Saskatchewan, Quebec, and even Ontario. 
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In 2006, Stephen Harper a conservative prime ministerial candidate decided to make equalization 
a political issue during his election campaign in order to gain electoral support in resource rich 
provinces such as Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan. He promised not to include 
revenues from non-renewable resources and adopt a 10 province standard in a revised 
equalization formula. But after coming to power, when he chose not do so, resource rich 
provinces forcefully attacked federal government. Newfoundland & Labrador warned the federal 
government of “dire consequences”. Nova Scotia strongly objected to change in formula; British 
Columbia voiced concerns in fear of losing eligibility. Alberta and Saskatchewan condemned 
Harper for not fulfilling his promise to exclude all revenue resources from the equalization 
formula. (Stevenson 2007, 12-13).  
 
As has been discussed earlier, federal government added in 2009 a ceiling to the equalization 
programme in order to ensure that growth in the total amount of equalization transfers remains 
sustainable in the future. Premier of Ontario argued that ceiling was introduced to reduce the 
transfer of Ontario that was eligible to become equalization receiving province for the first time. 
Smart (2009) argues: “The entry of Ontario to the program and its simultaneous restraint are 
obviously no coincidence: without changes to the formula, paying Equalization to a province as 
large as Ontario has the potential to be very expensive for the federal government.” Although in 
Canada’s executives led intergovernmental framework, there has been a great deal of 
consultation between federal government and provinces yet it is the former who has the last 
word. This apart, the federal government has other mechanisms at its disposal. It can control the 
cost of the equalization programme both by changing the resource revenue inclusion rate and by 
imposing a ceiling on the total cost of the equalization programme. According to a report, the 
ceiling contained in current equalization policy effectively reduces equalization transfers to the 
provinces by C$1.3 billion in 2014-15, and limits future increases to the annual GDP growth 
rate. This effectively turns the equalization grant system into a zero-sum game. When one 
province’s equalization entitlement goes up because of a decline in its tax bases or revenue 
sources, the other provinces’ equalization payments are reduced. For example, a recent report 
from the Parliamentary Budget Officer indicates that, because of the ceiling on total equalization 
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payments, the Quebec government’s decision to shut down its Gentilly-2 nuclear power plant 
reduced Ontario’s equalization payments by C$161.7 million (Parliamentary Budget Officer’s 
Report, 2014).  
 
Change in equalization transfers formula in 2014 is seen in terms of federal government 
choosing ‘losers’ and ‘winners’. ‘The have’ provinces led by Alberta remains extremely critical 
of inclusion of revenue from natural resources. Ontario a ‘have-not’ province vehemently 
attacked federal government for loosing transfers. During her election speech in 2014, Ontario’s 
premier, Ms. Wynne argued that “Mr. Harper deserves some of the blame for this turn of events. 
He first adopted an equalization formula that favoured Quebec in the (unrealized) hope of 
winning votes there. He then capped the rate of growth in the equalization kitty, creating a zero-
sum game that means Quebec’s gains become Ontario’s losses” (Yakabuski, 2014).  Ironically, 
in 2008, while Ontario was a ‘have’ province, McGuinty argued it was time to kill the 
equalization programme. “The way the federal government spreads money around this country - 
all the formulas, the calculations, the transfers - all have one core assumption: Ontario's rich and 
the others are not. Well that just isn't the case anymore. Ontario is strong and others are strong, 
too,” McGuinty further argued. “To speak of 'have' and 'have-not' provinces in 2008 makes no 
sense. We're a nation of haves these days” (Shuffelt, 2008). 
 
What follows from the discussion is that the executive federalism in Canada concentrates power 
in the hand of federal executives and provincial executives. Both orders of government have 
advantages to over-politicize equalization transfers for political or electoral gain. Federal 
government by changing formula can create ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ and later enter into side deal 
with ‘losers’. Provinces can shift the blame for poor service delivery to less equalization 
transfers from federal government. Garth Stevenson (2007, 2) argues:  
…..it is far easier and more convenient to attribute the deficiencies of one’s highways, hospitals, universities or 
schools to the distant federal government, which is generally inhibited by constitutional propriety and self respect 
from responding to the verbal abuse that is thrown in its direction, than it is to repair the deficiencies. Blaming other 
provincial governments is more hazardous, since they are more likely to take offence, and since their cooperation 
may be required subsequently in the endless battle to win concessions from “Ottawa”. 
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Stevenson (2007, 2-3) further argues: “However, even that may be more convenient than 
admitting that the source of the province’s problems might lie within its own borders, or even 
within the walls of its legislature. Thus it is unlikely that provincial grumbling over fiscal 
federalism would ever cease, even if the system were to approach perfection”.  
An independent institution like Australian Commonwealth grant Commission or Indian Finance 
Commission would be quite useful but neither federal government nor provinces are interested 
because that will be disadvantageous to them. An independent body can prevent political deal-
making, can address issues in a transparent manner. In fact, the majority of provinces reject the 
idea of replacing the intergovernmental process with an independent, arms-length agency. 
Federal governments too do not support the idea of having an arms-length body. Provincial 
premiers believe such independent and non-political body would prevent them from negotiating 
equalization with federal government directly and would pose threat to provincial autonomy. “A 
strong nationalist movement in Quebec and ‘regionalism’ (or ‘provincialism’) in Alberta, 
Newfoundland and Labrador, and other provinces however, means that the idea of provincial 
autonomy in Canada is understood to involve provincial agency that can negotiate deal with 
federal government” (Be´land and Lecours, 2011, 208-09). Provinces feel that they can exert 
direct influence on equalization policy in current form and are, for that reason is not willing to 
surrender that for a non-partisan, independent and more technocratic system where they would 
have little scope to influence the programme in their favour by means of political bargaining. 
Federal leaders appear to subscribe to the idea that the current equalization policy is 
advantageous to them and they can make political gains during election. Consequently, federal 
politicians do not find in their interest to abandon any direct institutional control over the 
equalization programme by handing it over to another institution. Be´land and Lecours (2011, 
209) argue: “As long as equalization remains subject to federal executive discretion, provinces 
have the opportunity to voice complaints about equalization decisions to a governing body 
concerned with politics as much as policy. Therefore, provincial governments have criticized the 
idea of an arms-length agency whenever it has been proposed.” 
5. Concluding Observation  
 
20 
 
Equalization programme -- considered as one of pillars of Canadian fiscal federalism -- has not 
only played an important role in reducing provincial economic disparities but also acted like the 
glue that holds Canadian federation together. Since the last one decade or so the glue appears to 
have become weaker. Despite massive literature on economic aspects of equalization transfer 
programme, literature on its political dimension in Canada is few and far between. The article 
has examined the challenges of equalization from the perspectives of second generation theory of 
fiscal federalism that focuses upon examining political motivation behind transfers and designing 
the institution to depoliticize it. Four factors makes Canadian equalization highly politicized: 
First provincial ownership of non-renewable resources and inclusion of revenue from these 
sources in the equalization formula; second is executive federalism that strengthens the hands of 
federal and provincial executives, i.e., Prime Minister and provincial Premiers; third is 
constitutional basis of equalization; fourth is very low level of understanding about this 
programme among the people.  
 
The current equalization arrangement, that encourages extensive consultation between federal 
and provincial executives for determining formula for allocation of provincial transfers, appears 
to be advantageous to both federal and provincial governments but not to the Canadian society as 
whole. Federal executive can use it to its political and electoral advantage as it has the last word 
on design and implementation of equalization formula. Provincial executives think that the 
current arrangement is favourable to them as they can exert direct influence over equalization 
transfer. Further, they can use equalization as an excuse for poor service delivery, blame the 
federal government responsible for shortfall in transfers and make it an election issue. Provinces 
hence support reform within the excisting institutional framework.  An independent and non-
political body like Australian Commonwealth Grant commission or Finance Commission of 
India, in line with second generation scholarship of fiscal federalism that may depoliticize, 
eliminate the perverse incentives and increase accountability of the equalization transfer, has 
failed to find favour with federal and provincial governments.  
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